A framework for concatenated event analysis by LAUMANN, Edward O.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No.39
A FRAMEWORK FOR CONCATENATED EVENT 
ANALYSIS55
by
Edward O Laumann David Knoke
University of Chicago Indiana University
3 2 0
Second Draft March 1982. Comments Solicited*
EUI
G 2 0 6 5 0
Presented at: Workshop on Empirical Elite Research,
European University Institute,
Florence, October 4-9 1982
x
We greatly appreciated the comments of Paul Burstein, Joseph 
Galaskiewicz, Franz Pappi, Robert Salisbury, and Rick Weil on 
an earlier version. Work on this paper was facilitated by a 
grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-8015529) and 
and HIMH research scientist development award to the second 
author (K2MH00131).



























































































This paper is distributed for discussion 
and critical comment and should not be 
quoted or cited without prior 
permission of the author
©  Edward 0 Laumann and David Knoke 
Printed in Italy in December 1982 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CONCATENATED EVENT ANALYSIS
Abstract
This paper presents a framework for analyzing national policy-making. After 
pointing out shortcomings in aggregated input-output models, elite incumbency 
investigations, and governmental institution analysis, we describe an event- 
structured approach that connects consequential organizational actors with a 
set of temporally arrayed events. An expert evaluation criterion is suggested 
for combining related events into scenarios, and a typology is derived by com­
pounding self-limiting standard decision cycles into more complex structures. 
A set of hypotheses is presented about the relationship between type of event 
























































































































































































Research cn national policy making falls under three general rubrics: 
aggregated input-output modeling, elite incumbency investigation, and govern­
mental institution analysis. Each approach contributes important insights 
into how policy debates are framed, developed, resolved, and implemented. But 
_-£>ch perspective, for reasons discussed below, overlooks an important con­
sideration: the structural complex relating organizational actors to tem­
porally arrayed policy events. This paper lays out the analytic elements 
essential to understanding national policy making from this framework. Subse­
quent reports will apply the proposed framework to data collected on policy 
networks in two national domains, energy and health. A technical Appendix to 
this paper describes empirical procedures used in the project.
THREE POLICY MAKING MODELS
Perhaps the most statistically sophisticated models of national policy 
w e  time series analyses that relate annual values of the national economy, 
polity, and sociodemographic structure to such consequences as budgetary 
expenditures, election outcomes, and income redistributions (e.g., Hibbs, 
1977; Tufte, 1978; Kncke and Macke, 1979; Griffin et al., 1982). Consciously 
mimicking renowned econometric models, and using much the same estimation 
methods, these systems of linear equations give a highly compressed view of 
the policifnaking processes. For example, Hibbs (1977) shewed that when con­
trol of the national government in 3rit|^ and in the United States passes to 



























































































reduce inflationary pressures that adversely affect affluent supporters of the 
party. Although such political business cycle effects undeniably occur, the 
fine-grained detail by which employment policy is created in the relevant pub­
lic and private institutions is lost in such gross annual aggregated measures. 
7ne political process is largely a black box in such models and the process by 
which inputs (political demands, macrosocial conditions) are transformed into 
outputs (policy impacts) remains shrouded in mystery.
A second generic approach to national policy takes a directly contrasting 
seance: the key to explaining policy decisions lies in the personalities of 
incumbents of the national ccrnrand positions. A substantial portion of the 
power structure research has been devoted to detailed analysis of she social 
origins and career patterns of legislators, I'eaeral agency executives, higher 
public servants, and private foundation and business directors on the apparent 
assumption that demography is destiny in national policy making (e.g., Mills, 
1956; Dcmhcff, 1967, 1970, 1979; Milbrath, 1963; Dye, 1976; Mccre, 1979; 
Kacke, 1931). As a result, substantial information is new available on the 
family backgrounds, schooling, marriages, club memberships, and corporate 
beard interlocks of the top position holders in key institutions.
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and thus confine their analyses to describing the social structure within 
which the unobserved policy negotiations presumably take place. In large 
measure, the limitations of the elite incumbency approach stem frcm research­
ers' inevitable exclusion fran corporate bcardroctns and country club lunch­
rooms where the real action allegedly takes place.
The third approach to national policy, which has predominated for genera­
tions among political scientists, emphasizes the role played by the proximate 
decision makers: the courts, the bureaucracies, the presidency, and especially 
he Congress. Treatments range frcm factual discussions of "how a bill 
becomes law" (e.g., Oleszek, 1978), to analyses of the constituent and party 
cues that impinge upon harried legislators (e.g., Kingdon, 1973; Fiorina, 
1974, 1977; Kuklinski, 1978), to investigations of regulatory agency "capture" 
by groups supposedly to be regulated (e.g., McConnell, 1967; Lowi, 1969), to 
studies cf the complex and extra-constitutional relationships between branches 
of the government (e.g., Wildavksy, 1974; Ripley and Franklin, 1980), to 
research on the history of specific bills and programs (e.g., Marmor, 1970; 
3auer et al., 1963; Pierce, 1971; Surstein and Freudenberg, 1978; Burstein anc 
’’acLeod, 1980).
Running through much of this literature is a conceptualization of policy 
making as an act carried out mainly by individuals in authority roles. 
Representatives, legislators, presidents, regulators, and judges possess the 
legal power to authorize new programs, fund on-going ones, reallocate valued 
goods and services, and punish transgressors. Tnus, it is not surprising that 
the bulk of attention has focused on the actual moment at which the binding 
decision is rendered, for example, on roll call votes cast on the House and 




























































































view ox' the cutcane is the antecedent portion of the policy process, in which 
issues must be recognized, latent interests mobilized, and options ofTered and 
winnowed long before a definitive selection can be reached (Kncke and Launann, 
1 9 6 2 ).
A smaller, but significant, portion of governmental institution research 
has attended to this more distal end of the policy process. The growing 
literature on pressure groups and the lobbying process (e.g., Truman, 1951; 
Salisbury, 1570; McFarland, 1976; Berry, 1977; Greenwald, 1977; Ornstein and 
Elder, 1973) has improved our understanding of how interests become translated 
into demands upon the authorities to change policy. Much of this research, 
however, is descriptive and anecdotal and is confined to analyses of either an 
individual interest group or the progress of a single issue through the long 
legislative or regulatory process. Aside from a few general frameworks that 
concede nonpublic organizations seme role in the agenda-setting procedure 
(Cobb and Elder, 1972), little systematic comparative research has been con­
ducted on the relationship of such actors to the authorities.
In summary, tne preceding brief overview of three basic approaches to 
national policy making highlighted their unique contributions and their 
shortcomings. The major neglect that we see in all three is their inattention 
to details of how the groundwork is laid for the policy debate, a component of 
the process that we believe must be placed within the context of a full set cf 
on-going policy events to be properly understood.
AU EVERT-STRUCTURED FRAMEWORK
In cur sociological perspective on national policy making we find little 
room for the personality aspects of individuals who hold key institutional 




























































































walking the metaphoric stage on which policy dramas are performed. The indi­
viduals who occupy formal leadership roles conduct themselves as agents, or 
fiduciaries, pursuing the interests of the collectivity, when necessary at the 
cost of personal aims and objectives. Hence, we can dispense with inquiries 
into how the social origins and training of individual position holders might 
affect the process and outcome of policy activities.
A second major assumption of our alternative policy approach is that much 
of the significant action takes place well before the definitive choice of a 
binding decision. We are not uninterested in policy outcomes— indeed explain­
ing the choice that is ultimately selected is one of the main purposes of the 
framework— but we believe that important explanatory components are located at 
stages of the policy process considerably antecedent to the casting of roll 
call votes by the authorities. Thus, we take seriously into account the pol­
icy making roles performed by more "distal" actors, many of whan are not for­
mally part of the Federal(government, but whose involvements crucially shape 
the policy debate and its eventual resolution.
These assumptions entered, the essence of our proposed policy framework 
’s a structural complex that connects consequential organizational actors with 
a set of temporally arrayed policy events. To understand how national policy 
unfolds, one must take into account how organizations perceive and respond to 
an opportunity structure for affecting policy outcomes that is created by the 
temporal sequence of policy-relevant events. Because a specific policy event 
is emcedaed in the context of other antecedent, concurrent, and impending 
events, policy analysts must incorporate the entire structure of organizations 
and events, and not focus narrowly upon single instances of either, as do most 




























































































Central to an analysis of an organizations—events complex is the flow of 
trustworthy and timely information about events among a set of actors with 
interests in the outcome of the events. This communication structure among 
actors oriented toward a common policy area is a critical factor for explain­
ing the dynamic unfolding of the policy process from initiation through com­
pletion. The content of information flowing through the ccnmunication struc­
ture may be scientific and technical, such as factual data about energy 
resource reserves (but see Wildavksy and Tenenbaum, 1981, cn the problematic 
nature of such "facts"), or it may be socio-political, such as messages from 
potential allies cr adversaries about their probable response to an 
organization's actions.
All policy actors, but especially organizations charged with proximate 
decision-making roles in democratic polities, have vast needs for valid, use­
ful, and up-to-date information. Complex formal organizations, whose prosper­
ity and very survival may be at stake in the outcome of policy controversies, 
develop elaborate organs to monitor continuously the environment for potential 
opportunities and threats (Wilensky, 1967). Information will be more reliable 
as a basis fcr framing organizational responses if it comes frcm sources of 
proven trustworthiness. A salient figure on the contemporary political scene 
is the indispensable "inside dopester" (Riesman, 1961), able to cut through a 
confusing fog of propaganda and trivial cr misleading intelligence. An essen­
tial function of the recurrent sub-government, cr "cozy triangle", relation­
ships among congressional subcommittees, bureaucrats, and private interest 
groups (Ripley and Franklin, 1980: 7), may be to estaolish dependable control 





























































































Equally important as the trustworthiness of information sources is the 
timeliness of the information which is transmitted. Given that the policy 
process consists of a sequence of events in which organizational intervention 
is possible at various points, organizations must constantly search for max­
imum impact points. Leverage for framing policy choices by the judicious 
transmission of targeted information may be greater for seme events in the 
policy process than for others. Organizational contributions to politicians' 
campaigns, most ccnmonly funr.eled through PACs (political action committees), 
e best seen not as attempts to "buy" favorable policy outcomes but as 
insurance of access to proximate decision makers at appropriate opportunities 
when the presentation of an actor's factual or political information concern­
ing an event may be most persuasive in influencing the outcome of an event.
The framework for concatenated event analysis is manifestly intended to 
serve multiple analytic objectives. First, we want to call attention to the 
variety of criteria that can be used to concatenate events into scenarios. 
The four fundamental types of scenarios that we ultimately identify can be 
used to explain the distinct patterns of policy development in a given domain.
a shall argue that each type of scenario is associated with distinct confi­
gurations of elements in the policy process. These configurations include the 
characteristic ways in which policy options are placed on the agenda fer 
authoritative action, the distinct patterns of participation by interested 
parties over the course cf the policy cycle, the relative importance cf the 
larger socio-political context with which the scenario events are embedded, 
the structure cf adversary relations among the participants, and the final 




























































































To develop the full implications of an event-structured policy framework, 
several basic concepts first must be defined. The next three sections present 






























































































Policy decisions typically occur within a bounded subsystem of the 
national polity, or policy danain (Knoke and Launann, 1982). Simply put, a 
policy domain is the substantive focus of concern of policy initiatives and 
debate. More formally, a policy danain is identified by specifying a substan­
tively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a set 
of consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting 
courses of action (i.e., policy options) that are intended to resolve the del­
imited substantive problems in question.
To illustrate this definition, we propose to construe a health matter 
today as referring to any phenomenon affecting the physiological, psychologi­
cal, or health-related social well-being of an individual or group of indivi­
duals. A national health policy domain asserts the further restriction that 
the relevant health policy options include only those presently considered 
permissible to be undertaken by Federal government organizations or nonpublic 
organizations with nationally oriented clienteles. Similarly, the national 
energy policy danain is delineated by the set of all policy options involving 
-the production or allocation of physical power resources that are seriously 
considered by the Federal government and the major private organizations with 
national markets or clientele.
The typical policy starts when one or more consequential actors label 
sane condition as a problem or issue and draw the attention of other actors to 
than problem. It is an issue because there are at least two alternative ways 
by which the issue may be resolved— even if the alternative courses of action 
believed to be possible or feasible by the relevant actors are, in the sim­




























































































sre. At root then, an issue is always a query, "what is to be done?", that 
has multiple answers. Thus, an issue is defined primarily in terms of its 
substantive content.
A oolicv oction is the empirical unit act in the process of issue resolu­
tion. It consists cf a statement mace by a policy domain actor that advocates 
a specific action to be taken, either by that actor or sane other authorita­
tive actor, with regard to the issue in question. We thus have an unambiguous 
empirical "marker" for the existence of a policy option, namely, its advocacy 
by at least one actor in the policy domain. The authoritative selection of a 
particular policy option from the many that may have been proposed is the 
ultimate result cf the issue resolution process. Once selected, however, a 
particular policy implementation may continue to generate opposition and thus 
to persist as an issue, especially if it appears to be failing in its intended 
purpose or if it lacks sufficient general support for its intended purpose. 
In other words, where the researcher decides 1 
a matter of greater or lesser arbitrariness, 
definitively resolved; most continue a, 
transformed in institutional character bee; 
policy rather than a policy option seeking
As a practical matter, an actor's involvement in an issue is most 
directly observable through its participation in very concrete activities, 
such as advocacy cf or lobbying on a particular policy option. An important 
analytic problem in any empirical investigation of the issue resolution pro­
cess thus becomes the rationale for ordering the concrete activities in a col­
lective decision-making system in relation to each ether and to mere abstract 
anc generalizes concepts, such as the underlying issues.
to terminate an issue sequence is
Few issues, then, are ever
policy queries, even if somewhat
;e they are now the established




























































































To make our task theoretically and empirically tractable, we argue that 
one can identify events as basic markers in the policy process. An event is a 
critical, temporally ordered decision point in a collective decision-making 
sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected. 
Every event is characterized as requiring an authoritative actor— be it a 
House subcommittee, the House as a whole, an executive officer, or a judge— to 
render a discretionary decision in a circunscribable time frame. Two or more 
events may comprise distinct points in a chain of related decisions leading to 
\ outcome. Each intermediate decision event in a chain is a necessary but 
not sufficient gatekeeper through which an option .must move (and thereby at 
times even be modified or transformed) in order to ripen into the final policy 
option selected for implementation. The decision-making process may be ter­
minated by a negative decision at any event in the chain.
Obviously, same events in the chain may be of greater significance for 
shaping the final outcome than others. What happens, for instance, in the 
initial House subcommittee hearings and deliberations in drafting the bill may 
be of greater consequence in deciding the content of the bill than the point 
f which a Congressionaily approved measure reaches the White House for 
Presidential signature. These events, then, provide the organizing focal 
point or rationale for the activities that the various actors in the policy 
domain ’undertake in seeking to influence policy outcomes. To be sure, partic­
ular events elicit distinctive sorts of actions that are appropriate to them. 
Efforts to assist a legislative aide on the specific wording of a provision is 
quite acceptable in the Congressional context, but strictly illegitimate when 
such assistance is directed toward a law clerk of a Supreme Court Justice 



























































































The terms ""policy domain", "core actor", "issue", policy option", and 
"event" are basic to the policy framework we propose. Because the structure 
among policy events as they relate to the organizational actors present in a 
domain is the cere of the framework, the next section elaborates on various 
attributes that must enter into consideration of how events are to be joined 
together.
CLASSIFYING EVENTS
Events do not occur in isolation, but are always embedded in temporally 
ordered sequences that provide the basic data for the analysis of policy deci­
sion. In our research, we are not interested in explaining why or hew indivi­
dual events ccme into existence nor in accounting for the diverse patterns 
that event sequences follow. That is, we will not propose a theory of event- 
formation, though conceivably one might eventually be developed (see Parsons 
and Smelser, 1956: 2U2-2U5, for a discussion of "phase movements" among system 
functions). Instead, events will be treated as givens, as the backdrop 
against which organizations perform characteristic roles in the rolicy domain 
draza. Tne sequence and timing of events shape the policy responses and ini­
tiatives of the core actors and set limits to the outcome of collective deci­
sions. To understand how events orchestrate the policy process as it unfolds 
across time, we must attend to the characteristics of events that are most 
likely to affect systematically the involvement cf actors in the domain.
The primary basis for classifying policy events is in terms of their 
consequences. In national policy making, under the Federal constitutional sys­




























































































(1) Program Initiatory (Terminating) Events: These events are, by definition, 
one-time occurrences that signal the start or end of sane new activity. 
They may range fran simple executive proclamations adding a minor func­
tion to an on-gcing agency to major congressional action creating a new 
cabinet-level department. The typical event is an enabling decision by 
an appropriate authority that calls a new entity into existence and 
establishes its purposes and authoritative relationships with other 
actors.
1) Regulative Events: These events concern authoritative actions that apply 
treatment principles to particular cases or promulgate new interpreta­
tions of rules carrying the force of law. At the national policy level, 
most regulative events revolve around specific regulatory agencies 
charged with the social control of public and private institutions.
(3) Funding Events: These events comprise the national budgetary process in 
which on-going programs are given annual allocations to expand, contract, 
or maintain current levels of activity. Derivative funding events con­
cern grants and contracts from public to private sector organizations for 
specific goods or services.
At times, all three types of events can occur in a meaningful sequence in 
exactly that order. For example, the creation of the Department of Energy in 
1977 from pieces of other agencies was clearly a program initiatory event, as 
was the appointment of James Schelsinger as the first, secretary. Within the 
Energy Department, however, the power to set energy prices, to regulate 
mergers ana securities acquisitions, and to set oil pipeline rates was 
reserved to the independent five-member Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 



























































































requests for economic relief are classified as regulative events. Finally, a 
26.2 billion authorization of Energy Department civilian research and develop­
ment, which was vetoed in 1977 by President Carter because it continued fund­
ing the Clinch River nuclear breeder reactor program he opposed, is considered 
one in a series of annual funding events, albeit more dramatic in its outcome 
than the typical routine spending bill.
Other event characteristics can affect organizational involvement. .Among 
the most important of these event attributes are visibility, scope, and con- 
trcversiaiity. Visibility refers to the amount of attention devoted to an 
event by an audience, whether the general public, the mass media, or the more 
restricted population of interested core actors. The scope of an event is 
indexed by the number and variety of actors interested in the substantive con­
tent of the event. Although visibility and scope are generally correlated, 
they are analytically distinct concepts. For example, capitalization of 
nuclear power plants is an event with broad scope in its potential impact on 
consumer utility rates yet it has very low visibility outside the electric 
utility and construction industries.
Contrcversialitv is revealed by the depth of polarization of interested 
actors into opposing camps that favor different outcomes to an event. A 
highly controversial event— which also may, but need not necessarily, have 
very high visibility and oread scope— pits bitter antagonists against each 
other in unyielding opposition, while noncentroversial events often enjoy wide 
consensus on the preferred outcome.
The relationships among events' consequential, visible, scope, and contr­
oversial attributes is not a theoretical matter from our perspective. Covari­





























































































these four characteristics of events can be used to generate hypotheses about 
organizational participation. However, we first must develop a procedure for 
joining or concatenating discrete events into larger sequences.
EVENT SCENARIOS
We stated above our belief that understanding the national policy 
processes requires us to analyze the complex that connects organizations with 
events. This perspective requires that we establish equivalences among an 
empirical set of events that are spread over time within a danain, on the 
basis of their greater or lesser similarity. In other words, we need to adopt 
seme criterion for concatenating discrete events into larger sequences, which 
we label event scenarios. Various concatenation criteria can be proposed, and 
the choice of a procedure is mainly a question of the researcher's purposes. 
We have identified four plausible alternative criteria:
(1) Causal Dependency: Events are linked together according an inherent 
"logic of decision making" by which a prior event is a necessary and suf­
ficient condition for a subsequent event. Mainstrean political science 
analyses of congressional events employ this criterion to chain together 
the various events by which a bill becomes law (e.g., introduction, com­
mittee referrals, hearings, reports, floor debates, amendments, voting, 
conferences, revoting, presidential signature; see Oleszek, T978: 15).
(2) Content Homogeneity: Events are joined together under this criterion on 
the basis of identical or similar content, perhaps latent rather than 
manifest. For example, events that incorporate the same scientific or 
technical problems and solutions could be placed in the same equivalence 
class despite being spread across time (e.g., various efforts to enact 




























































































(3) Audience-Participant Continuity: This criterion for placing events in a 
scenario relies upon the reappearance of the same core actors frcm event 
to event. The illegitimacy of this approach for cur theoretical purposes 
is discussed below.
(d) Expert Evaluation: Under this criterion, events are classified as links
in a chain according to an expert judgment by knowledgeable insiders, 
including if possible the policy makers themselves. In essence, expert 
evaluation requires persons having a thorough familiarity with the policy 
ccmain to reveal their ’cognitive maps” (Axelrod, 1976; Rocs and Hall, 
1980) of hew various events are organized into a hierarchy of succes­
sively mere encompassing equivalence classes.
For our purpose, which requires concatenation of empirical events into 
scenarios that will help to explain hew core actors become involved in domain 
policy making, the first three criteria are undesirable. Causal dependency is 
useful as far as it goes, but yields only very short chains of events with 
very limited generality. The content homogeneity criterion tends to impose an 
external, "social engineering" perspective on events that,, at higher levels of 
generality, ignores the subjective understanding of the situation held by the 
core actors. An audience-participant continuity procedure comes closer to 
reflecting the perceptions and beliefs of the domain actors but, in using the 
observed pattern of involvement to concatenate events, an illegitimate tautol­
ogy is built in. If the behavior of core actors is used to construct
scenarios, these scenarios then cannot be usefully applied to understand core
actors' behavior.
Thus, expert evaluation is the best method to concatenate events into




























































































(i.e., their managers) form the basic "conceptual lenses" (Allison, 1971: 2),
the frames of reference, and the assumptions that actors use to interpret the 
meaning of events in terms that are amenable to collective action. Any policy 
process is a continuously constructed and negotiated social phenomenon, not 
some concrete "objective" situation that can be observed in the same manner as 
the objects of a natural science. Therefore, informed experts' knowledge of 
the linkages among events is the preferred criterion for concatenating empiri­
cally observable events into successively larger and longer scenarios to be 





























































































Just as single events can be classified according to various attributes, 
event scenarios that consist cf two or more temporally ordered events can be 
classified according to seme common features. The elementary type of scenario 
from which all other types are compounded is the self-limiting standard deci­
sion cvcle. We refer to what the civics texts describe as the "customary" or 
usual sequence of prescribed events followed in passing a bill through the 
Congress to Presidential action, promulgating an executive agency's regulation 
in the Federal Register, or initiating a court case at a court of original 
jurisdiction through the appellate process to the Supreme Court. Of course, 
on occasion significant departures frem such a process may occur, but only 
when the rules are explicitly suspended. Essentially, however, the cycle is 
orchestrated by a set of explicit rules specifying each step that must suc­
cessfully be completed before moving on to the next. We say that such a cycle 
is self-limiting in the sense that rules also specify when action on a measure 
must terminate because time has run cut— for instance, at the close of a ses­
sion of Congress. All the prescrioed steps must be traversed all over again 
the next session if the measure is to be enacted into law. Because these 
steps are a matter of public knowledge and announcement, interested parties 
can organize their efforts accordingly. The many case studies of Congres­
sional action on various pieces of legislation nicely docunent the changing 
nature cf the sorts cf interested parties and the character of their activi­
ties ever the course of these standard cycles. To study the participation of 
public and private actors over the course of a standard cycle, the investiga­
tor must simply select the intermediate decision points cf most significance 




























































































that are related to these focal events.
The second type of scenario is called a consummated recurrent standard 
cycle because decision making about essentially identical substantive matters 
must be done on a regular or recurrent basis over time. Annual authorization 
ana appropriation bills for various executive agencies exemplify such 
scenarios. To study these scenarios parsimoniously, one can identify the 
critical intermediate decision event in each of several years to glean seme 
sense of the stability and change of the decision processes over time with 
rzaspect to particular substantive issues. A recurrent standard cycle is 
always consummated— that is, authorization bills must be passed every year 
even if the relative amounts being appropriated may change dramatically over 
the years.
In the third type of scenario, an unconsummated recurrent standard cycle, 
we observe the recurrent submission of a piece of legislation proposing' the 
adoption of a new policy initiative that simply fails to garner sufficient 
support for passage. Comprehensive national health insurance in the health 
domain and the coal slurry pipeline bill in the energy domain have repeatedly 
een considered by the Congress over the years but without success. Here we 
again propose to tag "marker” decision events in each unconsummated cycle to 
investigate the changing fortunes of support and opposition for such measures.
Finally, we can speak of the most complex type of scenarios, a con­
structed scenario, which combines decision events from a number of collateral 
decision cycles into a coherent whole, i.e., significant actors regard each 
set of policy options as belonging together to achieve same broader policy 
objectives or for strategic reasons of building a winning coalition. To 




























































































involved a multiplicity of measures requiring disparate Congressional and exe­
cutive agency actions, including: the imposition of novel taxes (e.g., higher 
excise taxes on gas-guzzling cars and higher gasoline taxes), the changing of 
executive regulations on permissible emission standards and automobile fuel 
standards, and the enactment of standby authority to impose gasoline rationing 
in the event of critical fuel shortages. In this example, the scenario events 
were either program initiatory or regulative events, but it is feasible for a 
constructed scenario to consist of events of entirely one consequential type. 
Recurrent standard cycles are most likely to consist solely of funding events, 
since these appear with predictable regularity, but funding events may also be 






























































































As implied several times above, our overarching interest in national pol­
icy making lies in understanding how the four basic types of event scenarios 
affect the various elements in the policy process. Table 1 summarizes the 
relationship we hypothesize between the four scenario types and five basic 
aspects of the policy process.
Table 1 about here
Policy proposals enter the national agenda by different means. For both 
the standard event cycles and their unconsunraated counterparts, initial agenda 
placement should result primarily from interest group politics. Tnat is, 
actors with the strongest interests in the outcome of the event will engage 
the usual set of influence activities designed to gain the attention of policy 
making officials: public media campaigns, constituency mobilization, transmis­
sion of persuasive information, contributions of political monies, formation 
of interest-group coalitions, direct appeals for consideration. To the extent 
that such efforts find sponsors in the Congress, executive branch department, 
jr regulatory agency, the interest group will be successful in placing its 
policy proposals on the formal agenda.
In contrast to the standard cycles, agenda placement in a recurrent stan­
dard cycle is virtually an automatic system function. Once a program has 
become incorporated as an on-going part of the governmental system, the calen­
dar routinely brings it up for reconsideration. 7ne annual funding cycle cf 
the budget ensures that agency and program requests for increments and reallo­
cations will appear before the appropriate decision making body at approxi­




























































































Constructed scenarios, as mere heterogeneous combinations of events 
designed to achieve bread policy objectives, typically are coordinated by a 
single actor with a vision of hew the various component elements fit into an 
overall scheme. At the federal level, constructed scenarios most typically 
are initiated by the office of the president through submission of legisla­
tion, promulgation of executive orders, filing of court briefs, and proposing 
regulatory changes. In taking these initiatives, the president can thus com­
pel other actors to react cooperatively or defensively to a possibly 
overwhelming onslaught.
Characteristic patterns of actor participation in the events also vary 
across types of scenarios. In the initiatory policies represented by standard 
cycles, we expect to observe a persistent core set of interested actors who 
are "first in-last out” through the entire process. Additional actors with 
□ore marginal interests in the issue may be mobilized later in the cycle to 
support the core players. In contrast, both the recurrent standard cycle and 
the unconsunmated standard cycle will exhibit much more stabilized participa­
tion patterns. Year after year the same set of specialized interests will 
appear at committee and commission hearings, offer the same basic testimony, 
and make the same lobbying pitches at the decision makers. The constructed 
scenario will display the most chaotic participation pattern, with the subsets 
of actors differentiated by the nature of the arenas in which various ccm- 
pcr.ent events are fought cut. That is, excepting the coordinating actor (usu­
ally one president's office), few if any participants will be found fighting 
simultaneously in the courts, Congress, bureaucracy, and regulatory agencies. 
7nis specialization of opposition and support in the constructed scenario 




























































































The third element of the policy process, the importance of the larger 
socio-political context within which the scenario events are embedded, refers 
to such aspects as the prevailing mood of public opinion, the state of the 
economy, the level of international tensions, and the partisan composition of 
the government (e.g., who controls Congress and White House). For a standard 
cycle scenario, whose typical duration is less than a single year, the context 
is relatively invariant: short of a dramatic intervention such as the outbreak 
of war, the basic "spirit of the times" will be constant during the course of 
ae scenario’s unfolding. Both the recurrent standard cycles and unconsim- 
munatea standard cycles, being spread out across a longer time, may take place 
in the context of more marked historical changes that alter the fortunes of 
the policy proposal. The most dramatic examples occur with a shift in the 
government’s partisan composition, as when Ronald Reagan replaced Jimmy Carter 
and began to dismantle many liberal social programs. Constructed scenarios 
also exhibit great variability in socio-political contexts, but primarily 
between institutions rather than temporally. The various arenas in which dif­
ferent events are located have distinct procedural rules and ideological 
rientations that complicate the coordinating actor’s task of melding the 
separate events into a unified policy. Of course, the more stretched out over 
time the process becomes, as with many anti-trust court cases that can take a 
decade or more, the greater the probability that significant alterations will 
occur in the socio-political contexts that impinge upon the events comprising 
the scenario.
Another important policy process element with variability across event 
types is the structure of adversary relations among the parties participating 




























































































cf opposition among the interest groups that favor or oppose the policy ini­
tiative. However, the level of opposition is not sufficient to block the pol­
icy from reaching a final decision. Unconsunmated standard scenarios have 
much higher levels cf adversial conflict, which persist over time in blocking 
the outcome favored by the policy's proponents. In contrast, a recurrent 
standard cycle has only token opposition, since its successful incorporation 
into the cn-going governmental functions indicates a battle already fought and 
won. For constructed scenarios, the nature of the oppositional structure 
critically depends upon the extent to which the time for decision is cir- 
cunseribed across the various arenas involved. If time is pressing for a 
resolution, for example in a declaration of war or other state of emergency 
(e.g., a fuel shortage), adversary expression should be minimal. Potential 
opponents will have insufficient opportunity to mobilize their forces and 
prepare a counter thrust. But, to the extent that the time for a decision can 
be stretched out, delayed, and postponed, the typical adversary patterns 
within each institutional decision arena will have time to reassert them­
selves.
Finally, the nature of the ultimate outcome to the policy process differs 
by event scenario type. Both standard cycles and recurrent standard cycles, by 
definition, obtain closure with a binding decision: seme form of the original 
policy proposal is adopted. Unconsummated standard cycles, again by defini­
tion, co not reach a final decision: their continual recurrence indicates that 
the ultimate outcome is postponed. For constructed scenarios, the interplay 
of influences across multiple institutional arenas is too complex in real 
instances to permit us to hypothesize with any confidence for general policy




























































































seme aspects of the heterogeneous policy set will be adopted, others delayed, 
and yet ethers defeated.
CONCLUSION 
(UNWRITTEN YET)
APPENDIX: IDENTIFYING EMPIRICAL EVENTS
To undertake concatenated event analyses successfully, we confronted a 
nunber of critical theoretical and operational questions. Using various means 
.0 identify the core actors in the energy and health domains, we sought inter­
views with informants fran each of about 200 energy domain organizations and 
175 health domain organizations. We designed a questionnaire to gather data 
from each informant about the organization’s involvement in policy domain 
events during the 1970s. As there were literally hundreds of events during 
the decade, it was patently obvious from the very beginning that we could not 
study all, or even most, intermediate events in all the standard cycles of 
interest to us. With less than two hours of interview time available, we were 
forced to choose a subset of events, marked by the dates (year and month) at 
which they occurred.
In selecting events for study from the array of candidate events in a 
Congressional standard decision cycle, we adopted the pragmatic rule to select 
the month the first committee (House or Senate) issued its report recommencing 
passage of a particular measure and the month the conference committee 
(comprised of both House and Senate members) issued its recommenced compromise 
version of the measure. Published work on Congressional action as well as co- 
inf ormants suggested that these two events were typically the mes 




























































































the first committee in either the House or Senate voted against recommending 
passage of the measure and continued this process for each of the subsequent 
years in which the measure was under consideration. For consummated recurrent 
standard cycle scenarios, we selected the event of the first committee to 
report a bill cut to its chamber in each new session. Since these cycles typ­
ically concern appropriations measures which must originate in the House by 
constitutional provision, the House committee report was typically selected as 
the focal event.
With respect to decision-making cycles involving executive agencies or 
the judiciary as the focal authoritative actors, it is rather mere difficult 
routinely to identify appropriate intermediate events because, although just 
as orderly and prescribed as Congressional sequences, seme of these events are 
less well-publicized and documented in publicly available sources than are 
Congressional events. We have thus specified a pragmatic rule that we select 
these executive agency events that relate to the month a regulation is for­
mally promulgated in the Federal Register or the month the President publicly 
announces his nomination for an executive position. In the case of judicial 
decisions, we specified either the time the case was first filed for action in 
a lower Federal court or the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case on 
appeal.
With respeco to constructed scenarios, which involve heterogeneous
authoritative actors, we 
stancard decision cycles, 
initial reviews, positive 
mittees, executive agencies 
ing, tine health policy
selected singular early events fran a variety of 
Typically, constructed scenarios consist of the 
or negative, by Congressional committees or subccm- 
, or filing dates for court cases. Broadly speak- 




























































































routinized in the decade under study than the energy domain, which just began 
receiving systematic attention by the national elite. Therefore, health pol­
icy events were typically concatenated in standard decision cycles while 
energy events were more often concatenated into constructed scenarios because 
many of the policy options were being considered for the first time. V/e con­
sistently followed the above procedures in selecting events for the recent 
past (i.e., the Carter years, 1977-1980). In the more distant past, for rea­
sons of fallible recall of events long ago, we selected consummatcry events, 
.g., at the point of actual passage of the act by the Congress as a whole, 
rather than events preceding passage. For these early events, an informant 
merely had to recall that the organization actively participated in seme 
(unspecified) events leading up to the final Congressional, executive, or jud­
icial action.
Following the guidelines, we eventually selected 81 energy events and 85 
health events for the two questionnaires. As presented to informants, a typi­
cal event, for the energy event, was:
,pril_1977 House Interior Committee reports a bill to control coal strip min­
ing (Congress passes act in July)
For the health domain, one event used was:
May-1978 Williams Committee reports bill extending assistance to Heal' ■Uu L i
intenance Organizations (HMCs) through 1983. Legislation also
includes provisions revis: 
and oceration.



























































































The sets of events were classified as one of four- primary types (paralleling 
the Psrsonsian functional subsystems: adaptive, goal attainment, integrative, 
and latent pattern-maintenance). Each subset of events was presented as a 
block to the organizational informant during the interview. Tne infermano 
indicated whether the organization had an interest in the event and, if so, 
the level of activity, timing of involvement, position taken on the event, 
involvement in formulating the policy or its alternatives, and collaboration 
with other organizations on that option. This information thus permits us to 
reconstruct both the histories of the individual events and the event activa­
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